Introduction
‘State-building’ implies enhancement of a new state’s capacities.[1] It also involves efforts to forge cohesive national identities and loyalty to the new state, frequently through mass education and propaganda campaigns, usually with external support. It includes efforts to build country-wide infrastructure so the state’s administrative reach and political authority are enhanced. Such projects are often pursued in the wake of armed conflict and civil strife.[2] Following the US and UK Afghanistan invasion in 2001 and then entrance of the remaining NATO allies in 2003, the Taliban was replaced with a new constitution, an interim government and scheduled elections for 2004. Coalition support for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s flourishing, from its inception to NATO’s formal ending of combat operations in 2014 will be evaluated. Jus post bellum deals with the rules for ending wars completely and fairly. The idea originates from Augustine’s proclamation: The purpose of war is a better state of peace.[3] The conflict in Afghanistan (and Iraq) has resulted in increased attention to the quality of the post-war environment, critical in determining a conflict’s overall justness. In policy circles, jus post bellum’s reference point has been Powell’s “Pottery Barn Rule”: ‘if you break it, you buy it.’[4] Pervasive pessimism regarding this subject was so great Bush re-branded state-building as ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction.’[5]

In contrast, this essay (while acknowledging the serious flaws) asserts state-building in Afghanistan according to Orend’s main criteria (just cause for termination, right intention, public declaration and legitimate authority, discrimination and proportionality[6]) has been successful. Since this paradigm conceptualises an aggressor and a victim[7], interpretations of jus ad bellum will determine which side is characterised as such. I start from the premise that the Taliban’s harbouring of Bin Laden and refusal to extradite him following 9/11 on the grounds demanded by America is sufficient for labelling the Taliban the aggressor and America as the victorious victim. This is strengthened by Kant (Orend’s inspiration) who argues for the international community to reconstruct a consistently belligerent state.[8] Previous prevalence of terrorist training camps,[9] would meet this criterion. Furthermore, according to the Doctrine of the International Community, states guilty of genocide have forfeited legitimacy and should be subject to reconstruction.[10] Taliban genocide of Hazaras[11] are grounds to deem the old regime as an aggressor not just against the US but against humanity. Part I will rebut the notion jus post bellum has not been adhered to. Part II evaluates development. Part III evaluates democracy and human rights.

I

Sceptics emphasise how jus post bellum has no legal basis.[12] UN security council resolutions may express humanitarian concern but do not imply obligation.[13] It is on this basis Chayes argues reconstruction efforts were aimed solely at protecting interveners.[14] The language of Western politicians implies self-interest. Gordon Brown proposed a stable order to thwart a “chain of terror” stretching from the mountains of Afghanistan to Britain’s streets.[15] Obama’s 2009 West Point address was very strategic and could hardly be described as altruistic: ‘We will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny al Qaeda a safe-haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum’[16] The US manual FM3-07 had no mention of humanitarian concerns and was littered with language of ‘stabilization’ and ‘stability.’[17]

Although the combined interest of fighting global terrorism was the main impetus behind Western contributions to state-building efforts, this analysis assumes self-interested motives and jus post bellum have to be mutually exclusive. President Bush insisted democracy and elections were America’s main priority.[18] A memorandum from General McChrystal revealed great concern for Afghan welfare, highlighting the importance of ‘protecting the people’ and ‘shielding them from all threats.’[19] Although sceptics suggest the war weariness of public opinion makes Orend’s criteria of ensuring a ‘just cause for termination’[20] extremely difficult, in spite of opinion polls expressing the sentiment that the war needed to end swiftly,[21] mainstream politicians did not capitulate. This is suggestive of an establishment consensus that termination was not justified until jus post bellum implementation.

Sceptics argue economic/infrastructure development is not altruistic but instrumentally necessary for war-winning, rendering post-war stability as a secondary priority. This is Smith’s view. He asserts the battle for hearts and minds against non-state actors has nothing to do with moral obligation but is simply required to achieve and consolidate aims of battle.[22] In many respects, this does conform to state-building in Afghanistan where infrastructure spending was highest in the most volatile regions.[23] This would also explain the chaotic implementation of infrastructure projects which do not look like they have been designed to facilitate a habitable Afghanistan but were simply driven by military timelines and locations.[24] This can be seen in road-building, explaining why ‘whenever the roads end, the Taliban begins.’[25]

Nevertheless, any successful model of jus post bellum would have to be based on a hierarchy of priorities and prioritising infrastructure that enables swift mobilisation of coalition forces (and now the Afghan National Security Forces) is part of that. Such initiatives are aligned with Patterson’s jus post bellum model of Order, Justice and Conciliation, with Order prioritized as the first step before Justice can be realised.[26] He rightly asserts Order is the first principle of jus post bellum which entails “stopping the killing,” consequently creating space for the restoration of governance and international sovereignty.[27]

Those who render state-building in Afghanistan as a ‘failure’ rarely take into account how unlike post-WW2 initiatives, Afghanistan epitomises the difficulty in distinguishing jus in bello and jus post bellum. A decade after “military victory,” NATO forces in Afghanistan remained engaged in the most intensive combat operations since Vietnam.[28] A year after withdrawal, 2015 saw 11,000 civilian casualties, a record then eclipsed in 2016 as UN Assistance Mission confirms new extremes of violence.[29] ISIS now have a presence, orchestrating suicide bombing attacks, killing eighty in Kabul in August 2016.[30] Such phenomena provides credence to those who dismiss jus post bellum’s viability based on this lack of a firm boundary between “conflict” and “post conflict.”[31]

However, it would be a misreading to conclude jus post bellum is irrelevant. Certain practices have been pursued as though directly inspired by Orend. One practice adhered to has been war crime trials of which their necessity has been highlighted by Walzer’s dictum: ‘there can be no justice in war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women.’[32] Orend highlights the importance of prosecuting those guilty of jus in bello war crimes.[33] The trial of US citizen John Walker Lindh who fought on behalf of the Taliban and his indictment by a grand jury on ten charges,[34] conforms to this. Orend stresses how jus in bello war crimes are almost always committed by all sides in the conflict, including the victor.[35]  This has also been taken into account, as exemplified by the sentencing of Sergeant Robert Bales to life in prison after being found guilty of slaughtering sixteen unarmed Afghan civilians in March 2012.[36] This illustrates the extent to which just post bellum is both relevant and has been successfully adhered to.

II

Orend allows for victorious victims to take compensation from the aggressor so long as it is not draconian in nature, not impoverishing civilians.[37] Prima facie NATO have superseded this criterion by not asking to be compensated. However, sceptics contend declarations of intent are insufficient when deciphering hidden political agendas. The notion Afghanistan was a ‘resource war’ is less prevalent than the view Iraq was ‘all about oil’ but it has still been described as ‘one of America’s dirty little colonial wars,’[38] suggesting coalition forces have looted resources, violating this key principle. Chossudovsky views America as the aggressor and Afghanistan as the victim, citing the Taliban’s eventual offer to hand over Bin Laden as evidence America wanted war to advance ‘the military-industrial complex.’[39] Supposedly Western concerns surrounding development and democracy are insincere because when the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, Washington said nothing and Taliban leaders were invited to Houston to discuss a Trans-Afghanistan pipeline with executives of oil and gas company Unocal.[40] A US diplomat said, “The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis,” explaining Afghanistan would become an American resource colony.[41] Western insincerity is attributed to how when a US diplomat was asked about the lack of democracy and persecution of women, his response was “We can live with that.”[42] The deal fell through after the Taliban started negotiating with the Argentinian Bridas Energy Corporation[43] and Chossudovsky contends it was because of this America launched the war on terror as a smokescreen to capitalise on resources. From this perspective, post-war state-building has nothing to do with Orend’s requirement of ‘establishing an enduring peace’[44] but exists to ensure resources can be channelled from Afghanistan to the West. This is supported by how two days after the bombing of Afghanistan commenced, American Ambassador to Pakistan, spoke to officials about building the pipeline.[45] The interim government stands accused of being colonial collaborators, epitomised by Karzai’s alleged former role as a consultant and lobbyist for Unocal.[46]

The aforementioned claims would undermine jus post bellum if such assertions were more grounded in evidence. Allegations regarding Karzai’s Unocal connection have been denied by spokesmen from both parties.[47][48] Any element of truth to this conspiracy is superseded in significance by how America has spent £61.5 billion (more than Marshall Aid) and Britain £890 million on reconstruction efforts since 2002.[49] This makes it impossible to contend state-building efforts have served to violate Orend’s requirement of not inflicting undue hardship on the civilian population in the form of compensation.[50] Furthermore, despite how US Geological Survey discovered Afghanistan is sitting on $1 trillion dollars’ worth of rare minerals[51], far from behaving as a colonial power, US officials contend ‘These resources provide potential for Afghanistan to develop its economy, to create jobs and build infrastructure.’[52] Indeed, the Afghan government has been free to sign a 30-year $3 billion contract with China Metallurgical Group (owned by the Chinese government) to exploit mineral deposits.[53]

Jus post bellum scholars of various varieties promote facilitation of development. Caldwell argues reconstruction through economic programmes sustained over the long-term must be adhered to for a fallen society to emerge from the jus post bellum phase.[54] The success of state-building is usually measured in terms of ‘development,’ incorporating economics, education, agriculture, electricity, transport and other infrastructure projects.[55] Winning ‘hearts and minds’ of Afghan civilians has been the primary objective for coalition forces to win the war and provide an equitable peace. Supposedly by providing security and basic needs, support is taken away from insurgents and the new order is able to provide basic services, security and economic prosperity.[56] However, effectiveness has been highly contested. In spite of all the spending, opinion polls often indicate Afghans see no notable improvement in living standards as Figure1 demonstrates: [57]

Afghan public opinion

Woodward provides a potential explanation for such poor results, arguing attempts to rebuild state machinery after conflict often lack ‘local legitimacy.’[58] Many state-building activities have been insensitive such as placing a military road through the middle of an irrigated agricultural property in Kandahar, significant because to Afghans land is not only their livelihood but a source of family honour.[59] This view has been further substantiated by a number of field studies, particularly those completed by Feinstein Center,[60] illuminating a near universal expressed perception that aid projects and organizations are performing poorly both in terms of quantity and quality.[61] This is intensified by how in order to ensure temporary governmental stability, state-builders have had to turn a blind eye to corruption, resulting in aid funds being absorbed in bribes to officials, alienating civilians and fuelling the insurgency.[62] The multitude of failures have to be conceded. Coalition inability to create stability has resulted in firms fleeing Afghanistan, driving up unemployment from 25% in 2014 to 40% in 2015.[63] This has incentivised large-scale opium production as an alternative livelihood, resulting in a 35-fold increase in opium production since the Taliban’s fall.[64] Counter-narcotics efforts have failed.[65] Afghanistan also remains one of the poorest[66] and most corrupt[67] countries.

Nevertheless, state-building still meets and exceeds jus post bellum reconstruction criteria. Caldwell’s requirement is for a successful occupier to invest resources for a period of five years.[68] NATO has done so for fifteen. Moreover, pessimists ignore the innumerable achievements brought about by donors, notably the British Department for International Development (DFID) and USAID.  In 2002, only 900,000 children attended school, virtually all were male but now there are nine times more children attending school, a third of whom are female.[69] Healthcare availability has resulted in less than half as many mothers dying in childbirth[70] and the mortality of children being cut by a third.[71] Access to clean drinking water has doubled.[72] Despite local disillusionment, state-building has produced economic growth with GDP growing from $4 billion in 2002 to $20 billion in 2013[73], with over 100,000 jobs being created by USAID loans alone.[74] In less than fifteen years life expectancy has increased from 44 to 64.[75] This meets Orend’s criteria of ‘the patient’ being ‘materially better off than she was prior to the exercise.’[76]

III

Orend’s “surgery” analogy prioritises state-builders creating a “rights-bearing political community”[77] and he contends it is this metric of human rights which is most important for the “foundation of human civilization.”[78] Since one of the prime jus ad bellum justifications for the war were Taliban human rights violations, fulfilling Orend’s criteria of “vindication of those rights whose violation ground the resort to war in the first place”[79] has to be assessed.

Retired American diplomat Dobbins who has documented state-building efforts since post-WW2 defines success as “the ability to promote an enduring transfer of democratic institutions,” arguing this supersedes economic recovery in importance.[80] Prima facie this has also been the commitment of state-builders. Cheney: “In this journey of freedom, they (Afghans) will continue to have America’s full support.”[81] During her visit to Afghanistan in 2006, Condoleezza Rice concluded there was “no better story of democratic development.”[82] Sceptics contend the nascent democracy lacks legitimacy. Suhrke argues it would have been far more popular to draw on Afghan traditions, establishing a constitutional monarchy.[83] No strategy was conceived for thwarting tribal tensions in Afghan society. Instead, they were institutionalised with the Single Non-Transferable Voting System.[84] Scheduled 2004 elections were undermined by intimidation of participants, meaning many Afghans did not turn out to vote. On 25 June 2004, 16 recently returned refugees were killed by the Taliban for carrying voter registration cards. One village elder told American soldiers “You guys are very nice, but you only come around once in a while. The Taliban will come here as soon as you are gone.”[85] Afghan elections have also been riddled with fraud and corruption.[86]

Nevertheless, millions of Afghans cast their ballots in the first democratic handover in their country’s history in 2014, resulting in President Ghani’s inauguration, curtailing corruption due to assistance from the international community who ensured transparency prioritisation.[87] In this election, women constituted more than 34% of voters.[88] Thus, it may have been overly optimistic when in 2005 Laura Bush proclaimed “tyranny has been replaced by a young democracy and the power of freedom is on display”[89] but it holds increasingly true today.

Assessing human rights in Afghanistan is usually done with reference to women’s rights. Laura Bush and Cherie Blair presented themselves as champions of this cause.[90] This is a useful metric considering under the Taliban numerous edicts were issued attempting to regulate women’s behaviour, forbidding them to leave their home unless completely veiled and accompanied by a male guardian. The UN Special Rapporteur noted apparent violations of Taliban edicts were met with assaults by agents of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, “with instruments that looked like leather cricket bats.”[91] More serious violations were met with “stoning, lashing and other forms of inhuman punishment.”[92]

Sceptics assert jus post bellum has not been fulfilled because women are still subjugated. Less than two weeks after the Taliban’s departure, permission to hold a women’s march through Kabul was refused.[93] Northern Alliance soldiers were broadcast beating women with whips. One soldier told the BBC “the men in the crowd listen to us, but the women don’t. They need discipline.”[94] Karzai also signed a law, which according to the UN, legalizes rape in marriage and prevents women leaving the house without permission.[95] This could be interpreted to fall short of the criteria cited by Orend that jus post bellum requires “construction of a new kind of domestic regime, more pro-human rights in nature.”[96] Without trivialising abuses, the word requiring attention is “more” and this is the crux of the matter when assessing success in terms of jus post bellum. It is a matter of degree. The aforementioned improved female access to education and voter participation along with how women now represent 11% of sitting judges and 20% of female judges are now in training[97], alongside the existence of female MPs such as Shinkai Karokhail who have been able to initiate legislation such as the approved Elimination of Violence Against Women Bill,[98] represent marked improvements and the conforming of state-building efforts to jus post bellum.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Afghan development has been more centred towards defeating the insurgency than meeting the needs of the civilian population, it has been haphazard and failed to win hearts and minds. Democratic governance has been even more deficient, exacerbating tribal divisions and institutionalising patriarchal traditions mirroring the Taliban.

The Hobbesian problem of how to overcome the ‘war of all against all’ (bellum omnium contra omnes) is not yet solved[99] and as a result, it is legitimate to question how relevant jus post bellum is as a tool of analysis. Nevertheless, according to standards advanced by numerous jus post bellum scholars, multi-national state-building meets (and in some respects exceeds) the required targets. Prioritising “Order” as suggested by Patterson, bringing war criminals (of both sides) to trial as required by Orend, sustaining development is in line with Caldwell’s criteria and the relative improvements in human rights is in line with the US tradition of postwar democracy establishment, as outlined by Dobbins. Therefore, multi-national post-war state-building in Afghanistan is successful according to multiple accounts of jus post bellum.

Copyright © 2017 Tal Tyagi. All Rights Reserved.

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[1] Conor Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan (New York, 2016) p.23

[2] Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan p.23

[3] Saint Augustine, The City of God (Rome, 1470) p.621

[4] Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York, 1995) p.527

[5] Pauline Baker, “Forging a US Policy Toward Fragile States”, PRISM, 1:2, (2016) p.74

[6] Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum’, Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 31 No. 1,  (2000,) p.117–137

[7] Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ p.124-125

[8] Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, and Other Essays, (Indianapolis, 1983) p.112.

[9] Satinder Bindra, ‘India identifies terrorist training camps,’ CNN New Deli Bureau, 19 September 2001 < http://www.webcitation.org/5eOvLBHJZ?url=http%3A%2F%2Farchives.cnn.com%2F2001%2FWORLD%2Fasiapcf%2Fcentral%2F09%2F19%2Finv.afghanistan.camp%2F> (19 April 2017)

[10] The National Archives, ‘Doctrine of the International Community [24/4/1999],’ The official site of the Prime Minister’s Office, 29 January 2003 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297  (21 April 2017)

[11] Human Rights Watch, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Massacres Detailed,’ 19 February 2001 https://www.hrw.org/news/2001/02/19/afghanistan-taliban-massacres-detailed  (21 April 2017)

[12] Eric De Brabandere, ‘The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical Assessment of Jus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept’, 43 Vanderbilt J Transnat’l L119 (2010), pp.126–132.

[13] Antonia Chayes, ‘Chapter VII½: Is Jus Post Bellum Possible?’ The European Journal of International Law Vol. 24 no. 1 (2013) p.293

[14] Chayes, ‘Chapter VII½’ p.291

[15] Julia Henry, ‘Gordon Brown warns of ‘chain of terror’ as he pays tribute to dead Marines,’ The Telegraph, 13 December 2008 < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/3741784/Gordon-Brown-warns-of-chain-of-terror-as-he-pays-tribute-to-dead-Marines.html> (21 April 2017)

[16] Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 1 Dec. 2009, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan (21 April 2017)

[17] Chayes, ‘Chapter VII½’ p.298

[18] Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan p.165

[19] Stanley A, McChrystal, ‘Commander’s Initial Assessment’, 30 Aug 2009, at 1–3, http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf (21 April 2017)

[20] Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ p.128

[21] Washington Post–ABC News Poll, conducted 10–13 Mar. 2011 www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll_03142011.html (21 April 2017)

[22] Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of Force in the Modern World (London, 2006) p.269–374.

[23] Travers Barclay Child, ‘Hearts and Minds Cannot Be Bought: Ineffective Reconstruction in Afghanistan’, Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 9/2, (2014) pp. 46

[24] Alissa J. Rubin and James Risen, ‘Costly Afghanistan Road Project Is Marred by Unsavory Alliances,’ The New York Times, 1 May 2011 < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/world/asia/01road.html> (24 April 2017)

[25] Peter Bergen, ‘Defeating the Attempted Global Jihadist Insurgency’, New America Foundation, July 2008. <http://newamerica.net/node/8924> (21 April 2017)

[26] Eric Patterson, Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Contemporary Post-Conflict (Yale 2012) p.43

[27] Patterson, Ending Wars Well p.43

[28] Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace (Cambridge, 2008) p.264.

[29] UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN, ‘Civilian Casualties Hit New High in 2016,’ 14 February 2016 < https://unama.unmissions.org/civilian-casualties-hit-new-high-2015> (21 April 2017)

[30] Steve Visser and Masoud Popalzai, ‘ISIS claims Afghanistan explosion that kills dozens,’ CNN, 24 July 2016 < http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/23/asia/afghanistan-explosion/> (21 April 2017)

[31] Patterson, Ending Wars Well p.161-180

[32]Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York, 1977) p.288.

[33] Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ p.127

[34] CNN, ‘Interview With John Ashcroft; Andersen CEO Star Witness; Does Oklahoma Governor Favor Racial Profiling?’ Transcripts, 5 February 2002 < http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0202/05/ip.00.html> (21 April 2017)

[35] Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ p.127-128

[36] Eric M. Johnson, ‘U.S. soldier who killed Afghan villagers gets life without parole,’ Reuters, 23 August 2013 < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-trial-idUSBRE97L0YV20130824> (21 April 2017)

[37] Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ p.124-126

[38] B. D. Hopkins ‘The Problem with “Hearts and Minds” in Afghanistan’, Middle East Report, 255, (2010) p.29.

[39] Michel Chossudovsky, America’s “War on Terrorism” (Québec, 2005) p.86

[40] Chossudovsky, America’s “War on Terrorism” p.81

[41] Chossudovsky, America’s “War on Terrorism” p.81

[42] Chossudovsky, America’s “War on Terrorism” p.81

[43] Chossudovsky, America’s “War on Terrorism” p.83

[44] Immanuel Kant, ‘The Metaphysics of Morals, Part One: The Doctrine of Right’, trans. H. Nisbet, in H. Reiss, ed., Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) p.167.

[45] Chossudovsky, America’s “War on Terrorism” p.89

[46] Chossudovsky, America’s “War on Terrorism” p.88-89

[47] GlobalSecurity.org, ‘Hamid Karzai,’ 21 August 2012 < http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/karzai.htm> (21 April 2017)

[48] Emperor’s Clothes, ‘EMPEROR’S CLOTHES INTERVIEWS UNOCAL OIL,’ 9 July 2002 < http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/lane.htm> (21 April 2017)

[49] Keith Perry, ‘Afghanistan has cost more to rebuild than Europe after Second World War,’ The Telegraph, 31 July 2014 < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11004928/Afghanistan-has-cost-more-to-rebuild-than-Europe-after-Second-World-War.html> (21 April 2017)

[50] Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum,’ p.128-129

[51] Charles Q. Choi, ‘$1 Trillion Trove of Rare Minerals Revealed Under Afghanistan,’ Live Science, 4 September 2014 < http://www.livescience.com/47682-rare-earth-minerals-found-under-afghanistan.html> (21 April 2017)

[52] Choi, ‘$1 Trillion Trove of Rare Minerals Revealed Under Afghanistan’

[53] Choi, ‘$1 Trillion Trove of Rare Minerals Revealed Under Afghanistan’

[54]Dan Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict: US Policy Toward Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq (Stanford, 2011) p.255

[55] Michael Ottaway, ‘Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States,’ Development and Change 33(5):(2002) p.1007

[56] M.G. Mantas, ‘Shafer revisited – the three great oughts of winning the hearts and minds: analysing the assumptions underpinning the British and Dutch COIN approach in Helmand and Uruzgan’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24:4, (2013) p. 731

[57] Raphael S. Cohen, ‘Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2014) p.627

[58]  Susan Woodward, ‘National versus International Legitimacy in State Building Operations’, Critique Internationale, Centre des Etudes et Recherche Internationale No. 28, (2005), p.1.

[59] Carlotta Gall and Ruhullah Khapalwak, ‘Winning Hearts While Flattening Vineyards Is Rather Tricky,’ The New York Times, 11 March 2011, < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/world/asia/12panjwai.html> (21 April 2017)

[60] Chayes, ‘Chapter VII½ p.301

[61] Paul Fishstein, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Balkh Province’, Feinstein International Center (2010), p.28

[62] Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins, ‘Cables Depict Afghan Graft, Starting at Top,’ The New York Times, 2 December 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/world/asia/03wikileaks-corruption.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (21 April 2017)

[63] Zachary Warren and Nancy Hopkins, Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People (San Francisco, 2015) p.55-69

[64] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Afghanistan Opium Survey,’ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, November 2014 < http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan-opium-survey-2014.pdf> (21 April 2017)

[65] Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan p.140

[66] The World Bank, ‘Least developed countries: UN classification,’ 2017 < http://data.worldbank.org/region/least-developed-countries:-un-classification> (21 April 2017)

[67] Yama Torab, ‘The Growing Challenge of Corruption In Afghanistan:

Reflections on a Survey of the Afghan People, Part 3 of 4,’ Occassional Paper (No.15) p.1-10

[68] Caldwell, Vortex of Conflict, p.173

[69] USAID, ‘Education,’ Afghanistan, 13 April 2017 < https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/education> (21 April 2017)

[70] WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group, and United Nations Population Division

Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-Agency Group, ‘Maternal mortality in 1990-2015,’ Afghanistan, <

http://www.who.int/gho/maternal_health/countries/afg.pdf> (21 April 2017)

[71] House of Commons International Development Committee, Reconstructing Afghanistan: Fourth Report of Volume II (Session 2007-08) p.51

[72] WHO/ UNICEF, ‘Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation,’ < https://www.wssinfo.org/data-estimates/tables/> (21 April 2017)

[73] Richard Hogg, Claudia Nassif, Camilo Gomez Osorio, William Byrd, and Andrew Beath, ‘Afghanistan in Transition: Looking beyond 2014,’ The World Bank (2014) p.47-52

[74] USAID, ‘Achievements in Afghanistan,’ Afghanistan, August 2014 https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/Achievements%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf (21 April 2017)

[75] USAID, ‘Achievements in Afghanistan’

[76] Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum’, p.124

[77] Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum’, p.124

[78] Stahn and Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum p.43

[79] Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Plymouth, 2006) p.163

[80] James Dobbins, America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, RAND Corporation (MR-1753) (2005) p.2

[81]Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, p.158-9

[82] Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, p.158-9

[83] Sonja Grimm & Wolfgang Merkel ‘War and Democratization: Legality, Legitimacy and Effectiveness, Democratization’, 15:3, (2008) pp.457-471

[84] Grimm & Merkel ‘War and Democratization,’ pp.457-471

[85] Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan p.163

[86] Ian Pannell, ‘Afghan election fraud is unearthed,’ BBC News, Kabul, 18 August 2009 < http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8207315.stm> (21 April 2017)

[87] Democracy International, ‘Afghanistan Election Observation Mission 2014 – Final Report,’ January 2015 < http://democracyinternational.com/media/DI%202014%20EOM%20Final%20Report%20-%20Feb%2011%20FINAL.pdf> (21 April 2017)

[88] BBC News, ‘Afghanistan presidential poll hailed as a ‘success’’ 6 April 2014 < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-26908464> (21 April 2017)

[89] Keane, US Nation-Building in Afghanistan, p.158-9

[90] Sultan Barakat & Gareth Wardell, ‘Exploited by whom? An alternative perspective on humanitarian assistance to Afghan women, Third World Quarterly’, Vol 23, No 5, (2002) p.910

[91]Barakat & Wardell, ‘Exploited by whom?’ p.924

[92] Barakat & Wardell, ‘Exploited by whom?’ p.915

[93] Barakat & Wardell, ‘Exploited by whom?’ p.910

[94] Barakat & Wardell, ‘Exploited by whom?’ p.910

[95] Ben Farmer, ‘Hamid Karzai signs law ‘legalising rape in marriage,’’ The Telegraph, 31 March 2009 < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/5080797/Hamid-Karzai-signs-law-legalising-rape-in-marriage.html> (21 April 2017)

[96] Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars p.109-24

[97] USAID, ‘Achievements in Afghanistan’

[98] Human Rights Watch, ‘Afghanistan: Reject New Law Protecting Abusers of Women,’ 4 February 2014 < https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/04/afghanistan-reject-new-law-protecting-abusers-women> (21 April 2017)

[99] Grimm & Merkel ‘War and Democratization,’ pp.457-471

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